Legal doctrine of «later» H. Hart: outline of positions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17308/law/1995-5502/2022/3/91-103Keywords:
H. Hart, legal positivism, methodology of jurisprudence, concept of law, law and morality, legal rule, legal obligation, rule of recognition, legal indeterminacy, judicial decisionAbstract
The article offers the first in Russian literature explication of changes in views of the British jurist Herbert Hart after a publication of his “classic” treatise “The Concept of Law” (1961). The relevance of the paper is due both to significance of H. Hart’s figure for modern philosophy of law, and to a need for a more voluminous perception of his ideas. Structurally, the article includes an overview of basic settings of the author’s 1950s–1961 analytical-positivist doctrine as well as a compact statement of subsequent changes in his conceptualization of law. As a result, among the most important corrections of H. Hart’s initial position the article includes: limiting a role of linguistic-philosophical methodology in jurisprudence, changing an account of positivism, narrowing applicability of the “practice theory of rules”, changing an emphasis in explaining obligations, deserting a purely linguistic model of legal indeterminacy, etc. At the same time preservation of basic parameters of H. Hart’s legal doctrine, its status and value in modern jurisprudence is noted.









