The problem of the federative composition of the budget and financial sovereignty of Russia

Abstract

The article examines the problems of the federal composition of the budgetary and financial sovereignty of Russia. In this regard, the current model of budgetary federalism in Russia has been analyzed. Based on the analysis, the main shortcomings of the model of budgetary federalism in Russia and the reasons for them (for example, legislative discretion) are highlighted. The following are noted as shortcomings of the model of budgetary federalism of Russia: excessive centralization of federal legislation regarding the settlement of issues of federal relations, transfer of powers to the constituent entities of the Russian Federation without constitutionally balanced financial support, amendments to federal target programs without fully taking into account the financial interests of the constituent entities, ambiguity and vagueness in the competence of the bodies public authority on budgetary and financial issues, "quasi-implementation" of decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation - the legislator's distortion in practice of the constitutional and legal meaning of the instructions contained in the decisions. The issue of the constitutionality of the model of interbudgetary regulation and the so-called "voluntary powers" of the subjects of the Russian Federation is indicated as a debatable one. In the final part of the article, on the basis of the problematic, it is indicated the need for consistent strengthening of sovereign statehood, guarantees of federal integrity, assistance in the formation of a relative, objectively substantiated independence of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation and local governments. It is also proposed to clearly define the constitutionally predetermined functions and competences of all levels and public authorities at the legal and regulatory level.