Information policy of the Bank of Russia and the central banks of other countries
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17308/econ.2023.2/11155Keywords:
monetary policy, communication policy, transparency, credibility, inflation targetingAbstract
Subject. The information policy of the central bank plays an important role in increasing transparency and confidence in the actions of the central bank. It also has a significant impact on the expectations of economic agents. In recent years, the Bank of Russia has taken a number of measures aimed at increasing the transparency of the monetary policy. Its information policy has undergone significant changes due to the transition to the inflation targeting regime in 2014-2015. For a long time, economists and researchers have had controversial opinions about the impact of central banks’ information transparency on the economy. The development of financial institutions, monetary policy instruments, and its goals have created new conditions for and requirements to the regulators’ information policy.
Objectives. An original study of the content of the information policy of the Bank of Russia and the central banks of other countries, as well as its evolution stipulated by the transition to the inflation targeting regime, their comparison to determine common or distinctive features. An assessment of their adequacy and whether it is reasonable to adjust the information policy of the Bank of Russia in order to increase its credibility and to stabilise inflation expectations. An analysis of changes in the awareness of the population of Russia about the monetary policy during the period preceding to the complete transition to the inflation targeting regime and at present time.
Methodology. In our study, we used the empirical method of comparison and the following theoretical methods: dialectical and the method of analysis and synthesis based on the study of relevant literature dedicated to the topic. MS Excel package was used to analyse and visualise the results.
Results. The study involved comparing the communication policy of the Bank of Russia during the period preceding to the introduction of the inflation targeting regime and preparation to it (2012) and after several years of its operation (2021). It also analysed the influence of the expansion of communication channels on the dynamics of expectations of the population of Russia regarding future annual inflation. The communication policies of central banks of other countries targeting inflation were studied and used to develop recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of the information policy and the monetary policy of the Bank of Russia as a whole.
Conclusions. A comparison of information materials of the Bank of Russia for the period preceding to the preparation for the transition to the inflation targeting regime (2012) and the present time (2021) showed that the Bank of Russia increased the number of regularly published information messages and analytical materials by almost 3 times. A comparison of the information policy of the Bank of Russia and central banks of other countries revealed that taken as a whole the number and content of published materials corresponds to generally accepted international standards, including the practice of countries with a longer experience of inflation targeting. Works dedicated to the topic were studied and the benefits of using certain types of communications in other countries were assessed. As a result, recommendations were developed on how to improve the effectiveness of both information policy and monetary policy as a whole.
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References
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