MODEL OF AGENTS WITH A COMMON POINT OF INTEREST AND A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF AGENTS PRESENT AT THE SAME TIME
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.17308/sait/1995-5499/2025/3/101-109Keywords:
decision theory, multi-agent systems, Lotka — Volterra model, segregation, descriptive logic, simulation modeling, game theoryAbstract
A model is developed for agents visiting a common point (or points) of interest. Agents are divided into those whose satisfaction from visiting decreases in the presence of other visitors, and those whose satisfaction increases in this case. For agents of the first type, an increase in the number of agents above a certain value prevents agents from visiting this point. Agents have variable parameters of their desire to visit the point and tolerate the presence of other agents. The change in parameters depends on how long ago the last visit to the points of interest was. This paper offers an explanation of the phenomenon of why people can tolerate for a long time, tolerate, and then simultaneously begin to strive for some point of interest. The paper briefly considers the game-theoretic formulation of the problem, and also conducts simulation modeling in the Wolfram Mathematica environment. The patterns and mechanisms of formation of ideas about normative decision-making, including social influence, and taking into account the uncertainty arising from different contexts and experiences of subjects, are studied. It was revealed both the emergence of fluctuations in the number of agents close to periodic ones, similar to the Lotka — Volterra model, and the complete division of agents into different points of interest depending on the initial conditions, similar to the Schelling model. This model can be used in planning public spaces that house shops, cafes, and other institutions, in order to reduce the load on each institution and eliminate the mutual influence of agents with different interests when visiting these institutions.
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