Детерминанты коррупционного поведения импортёров: экспериментальный анализ институциональных и личностных факторов

Андрей Алексеевич Волков; Александр Юрьевич Филатов

doi:10.17308/econ.2026.1/13606

Authors

Andrey A. Volkov Far Eastern Federal University
Alexander Yu. Filatov Far Eastern Federal University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17308/econ.2026.1/13606

Keywords:

corrupt collusion, bribery, customs administration, economic mechanism, laboratory experiment, behavioral factors, institutional design

Abstract

Subject. Corruption practices in the customs sphere distort trade flows and create legal uncertainty for participants in foreign economic activity. When deciding on illegal importation and bribery, an importer is guided not only by rational calculation but also by individual characteristics.
Purpose. The work aims to identify the factors determining an importer's willingness to engage in illegal importation and the offered bribe size, as well as to test importers' sensitivity to economic mechanism for disrupting corrupt collusion.
Methodology. We conducted the study through a laboratory experiment involving 108 participants assigned to the roles of importers and customs officers. Participants interacted with each other over ten rounds with varying duty rates and the absence or presence of a collusion disruption mechanism. We analyzed their behavior using regression models with controls for the socio-demographic and personal characteristics of the participants.
Results. The implementation of the collusion disruption mechanism reduces the probability of a bribe offer by an importer by 15.6 percentage points; however, sensitivity to it depends on the duty level: at a low rate, corruption virtually disappears, while at a high rate, the effect is weaker. Risk propensity increases both the share of illegal imports and the bribe size, whereas high subjective income promotes honesty. Age differences were identified. Personal characteristics also significantly affect the bribe size, with the direction of the relationships being context-dependent. An effect of corruption experience accumulation was found: the bribe size grows from round to round in repeated interactions. At the same time, after the implementation of the collusion disruption mechanism, the dynamics reverse.
Conclusions. The results can be used in developing anti-corruption mechanisms in the customs sphere aimed at changing importers' incentives.

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Author Biographies

Andrey A. Volkov, Far Eastern Federal University

Postgraduate Student
Alexander Yu. Filatov, Far Eastern Federal University

Cand. Sci. (Phys.-Math.), Assoc. Prof.

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