The various possibilities of the optimal solutions in the game "Inspection"

Abstract

Importance: making decisions is based on the necessary information. Optimization in different information conditions yields different managerial decisions. To study these conditions is especially convenient using the models of Game Theory. Purpose: аnalysis of options of the optimization solution process and the improvement of the dependence of its results on the information base in simple situations corresponding to the game can be presented in the dynamical and statical format. Research design: we give a generalization and analysis of the famous «Inspection» game. The analysis of the process of making optimal decisions in the dynamical recursive and in the statical matrix format allows us to estimate the comparative usefulness of the information received when creating optimal behavioral strategy. The analysis of the versions of the game with the active and with the passive behavior of players allows us to set the bounds inside of which one of these two behaviors is optimal. Results: we form optimal behavioral strategies under the assumptions that the information about the results of the previous steps of the game is available or not. We obtain the edestimation of the usefulness of the information received. We present the analysis of the influence of the possibility to get the information on the optimal strategies of the players and on the results of the game.