"Smart University" project: fair matching of students to academic trajectories
Abstract
Subject. The goal of “Smart University” information system is to increase the efficiency and quality of the academic process at Saint Petersburg State University of Economics through the automation of its various aspects and phases which is based on mathematical modelling. The optimization model of finding a fair matching of students to academic trajectories is discussed in the paper as a mathematical kernel of one of the information system’s components.
Objectives. The goal of the paper is to provide an exact mathematical formulation and corresponding numerical results to the problem of finding a fair matching of students to academic trajectories, their preferences and academic performance was taken into account.
Method. The optimization model was developed to find a matching in the many-to-one two-sided market, the corresponding concept of stable matching and conflicts was discussed.
Results. The optimization model of finding a fair matching was verified by numerical simulations with the full-scale data for the students of the “Econоmics” academic program of the Saint Petersburg State University of Economics. Numerical results demonstrated the effectiveness of the proposed model in finding a fair matching with a minimum number of conflicts and with a maximal level of satisfaction of agents from both sides of the market (students and academic trajectories) with the matching obtained.
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References
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