ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА АУКЦИОНОВ
Keywords:
auction theory, mechanism design, open and seal bid auctions, revenue equivalence theorem
Abstract
During the last half-century auctions, being before the marginal field of economics, known only because of art auctions, have become the best story of success in application of abstract theoretic models of economics to practice. The paper contains non-technical survey of auction types and their features, and also the shortest proof of the Roger Myerson revenue equivalence theorem. Special attention is paid to the most successful auction stories as well as famous fails. The proposed examples are analyzed taking into account the auction design. Also some materials connected with the frontier field of research – network auctions are presented in the paper.
Metrics
Metrics Loading ...
References
1. Филатов А. Ю. Математические модели несовершенной конкуренции / А. Ю. Филатов, Н. И. Айзенберг. – Иркутск : Изд-во Иркут. гос. ун-та, 2012.
2. Varian H. Price discrimination / H. Varian // Hand-book of Industrial Organization. – 1989. – V. 1. – P. 597–654.
3. Krishna V. Auction theory / V. Krishna. – Academic press, 2009.
4. Klemperer P. Auction theory : a guide to the literature / P. Klemperer // Journal of Economic Surveys. – 1999. – V. 13. – No 3. – Р. 227–286.
5. Vickrey W. Counter-speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders / W. Vickrey // The Journal of finance. – 1961. – V. 16. – No 1. – Р. 8–37.
6. Lucking-Reiley D. Vickrey auctions in practice : from nineteenth-century philately to twenty-first-century e-commerce / D. Lucking-Reiley // The Journal of Economic Perspectives. – 2000. – V. 14. – No 3. – P. 183–192.
7. Myerson R. Optimal auction design / R. Myerson // Mathematics of operations research. – 1981. – V. 6. – No 1. – P. 58–73.
8. Binmore K. The biggest auction ever : the sale of the British 3G telecom licences / K. Binmore, P. Klemperer // The Economic Journal. – 2002. – V. 112. – P. 74–96.
9. Cramton P. Collusive bidding : lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions / P. Cramton, J. Schwartz // Journal of Regulatory Economics. – 2000. – V. 17. – No 3. – P. 229–252.
10. Roth A. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions : evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet / A. Roth, A. Ockenfels // The American Economic Review. – 2002. – V. 92. – No 4. – P. 1093–1103.
11. Айзенберг Н. И. Моделирование и анализ механизмов функционирования электроэнергетических рынков / Н. И. Айзенберг, А. Ю. Филатов. – Иркутск : Изд-во Иркут. гос. ун-та, 2013.
2. Varian H. Price discrimination / H. Varian // Hand-book of Industrial Organization. – 1989. – V. 1. – P. 597–654.
3. Krishna V. Auction theory / V. Krishna. – Academic press, 2009.
4. Klemperer P. Auction theory : a guide to the literature / P. Klemperer // Journal of Economic Surveys. – 1999. – V. 13. – No 3. – Р. 227–286.
5. Vickrey W. Counter-speculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders / W. Vickrey // The Journal of finance. – 1961. – V. 16. – No 1. – Р. 8–37.
6. Lucking-Reiley D. Vickrey auctions in practice : from nineteenth-century philately to twenty-first-century e-commerce / D. Lucking-Reiley // The Journal of Economic Perspectives. – 2000. – V. 14. – No 3. – P. 183–192.
7. Myerson R. Optimal auction design / R. Myerson // Mathematics of operations research. – 1981. – V. 6. – No 1. – P. 58–73.
8. Binmore K. The biggest auction ever : the sale of the British 3G telecom licences / K. Binmore, P. Klemperer // The Economic Journal. – 2002. – V. 112. – P. 74–96.
9. Cramton P. Collusive bidding : lessons from the FCC spectrum auctions / P. Cramton, J. Schwartz // Journal of Regulatory Economics. – 2000. – V. 17. – No 3. – P. 229–252.
10. Roth A. Last-minute bidding and the rules for ending second-price auctions : evidence from eBay and Amazon auctions on the Internet / A. Roth, A. Ockenfels // The American Economic Review. – 2002. – V. 92. – No 4. – P. 1093–1103.
11. Айзенберг Н. И. Моделирование и анализ механизмов функционирования электроэнергетических рынков / Н. И. Айзенберг, А. Ю. Филатов. – Иркутск : Изд-во Иркут. гос. ун-та, 2013.
How to Cite
Савватеев , А. В., & Филатов , А. Ю. (1). ТЕОРИЯ И ПРАКТИКА АУКЦИОНОВ. Eurasian Journal of Economics and Management, (3), 119-131. Retrieved from https://journals.vsu.ru/econ/article/view/2626
Section
Mathematical and Tool Methods of Economy
