Analysing the efficiency of public procurement procedures using game-theory models

Keywords: Game theory, auction theory, public procurement, competitive procedures, electronic auction


Subject. Public procurement plays an important role in providing public services and ensuring that the target programmes of government structures are implemented. Therefore, it is crucial to improve the efficiency of procurement procedures. The efficiency of public procurement is largely determined by the conditions and format of the procurement procedure. So, it is of particular interest to identify the factors influencing the customer’s choice of the optimal procedure for the procurement of different types of goods, as well as to assess the impact of these factors on the effectiveness of existing procedures.
Objectives. The aim of the study was to develop a model for selecting procurement procedures for different types of goods and to assess the effectiveness of current public procurement procedures.
Methodology. In the study, we used the findings of auction theory, qualitative and quantitative analysis techniques to identify public procurement, determine its value to participants, and assess its effectiveness. The following goods were selected for empirical assessment: paper, medicines, automotive components, and construction services. The empirical basis of the study was the data obtained from the Unified Information System (UIS) in Procurement website.
Results. We developed and estimated a model for choosing a supplier selection procedure (for empirical assessment, the probability of choosing a certain procedure was determined by the number of uses of the procedures among completed procurement procedures). We also designed and estimated a model of price effectiveness for public procurement procedures that are actually in use (price effectiveness in this study means the final price of the contract, as well as the reduction of the final price against the initial maximum price).
Conclusions. Based on the analysis, we concluded that it is necessary to introduce negotiations as an intermediate procedure between the auction and procurement from a single supplier. Such a procedure is used in other countries. The auction procedure fails to provide the best quality goods, especially in the case of complex goods or services with a high level of uncertainty. For simple goods, an auction is the most favoured procedure under the conditions of high competition and a preference for quality. It allows selecting the most experienced and financially reliable supplier.


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Author Biographies

Aleksandra M. Zhemkova, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration

Senior Researcher

Larisa M. Nikitina, Voronezh State University

Dr. Sci. (Econ.), Full Prof.

Tatiana N. Gogoleva, Voronezh State University

Dr. Sci. (Econ.), Full Prof.


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How to Cite
Zhemkova, A. M., Nikitina, L. M., & Gogoleva, T. N. (2023). Analysing the efficiency of public procurement procedures using game-theory models. Proceedings of Voronezh State University. Series: Economics and Management, (4), 20-32.
Economic Theory